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Abstract—We consider the uplink of a cellular massive MIMO
network. Acquiring channel state information at the base stations
(BSs) requires uplink pilot signaling. Since the number of
orthogonal pilot sequences is limited by the channel coherence,
pilot reuse across cells is necessary to achieve high spectral
efficiency. However, finding efficient pilot reuse patterns is non-
trivial especially in practical asymmetric BS deployments. We
approach this problem using coalitional game theory. Each BS
has a few unique pilots and can form coalitions with other
BSs to gain access to more pilots. The BSs in a coalition thus
benefit from serving more users in their cells, at the expense of
higher pilot contamination and interference. Given that a cell’s
average spectral efficiency depends on the overall pilot reuse
pattern, the suitable coalitional game model is in partition form.
We develop a low-complexity distributed coalition formation
based on individual stability. By incorporating a base station
intercommunication budget constraint, we are able to control
the overhead in message exchange between the base stations and
ensure the algorithm’s convergence to a solution of the game
called individually stable coalition structure. Simulation results
reveal fast algorithmic convergence and substantial performance
gains over the baseline schemes with no pilot reuse, full pilot
reuse, or random pilot reuse pattern.
I. INTRODUCTION
The data traffic in cellular networks has increased expo-
nentially for decades and this trend is expected to continue
in the foreseeable future, spurred by new smart devices and
innovative applications. The immense traffic growth has tradi-
tionally been handled by deploying more base stations (BSs)
and allocating more frequencies for cellular communications.
These approaches are less attractive in the future, since it
is expensive to put a BS at every rooftop and because the
spectral resources are scarce in the bands suitable for wide-
area coverage (below 6 GHz). It is therefore important to
also develop techniques that improve the spectral efficiency
(bit/s/Hz/cell) in cellular networks, without requiring more
BSs or additional frequency spectrum. The massive MIMO
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(multiple-input, multiple-output) concept was proposed in the
seminal paper [2] as an attractive way to improve the spectral
efficiencies of future networks by orders of magnitude.
In massive MIMO networks, the BSs are equipped with
arrays with many active antenna elements (e.g., hundreds of
small dipole antennas), which are processed coherently to
improve the signal quality in both the uplink and the down-
link [3]. Massive MIMO is essentially a multi-user MIMO
technology, thus it delivers high spectral efficiency by serving
many user equipments (UEs) simultaneously. The performance
per UE might not be higher than in contemporary networks,
but the sum spectral efficiency per cell can be increased
tremendously [4].
It is well known that multi-user MIMO systems require
channel state information (CSI) at the BSs in order to separate
the uplink signals sent in parallel by different UEs and to direct
each downlink signal towards its intended receiver [5]. CSI
can be acquired by sending predefined pilot sequences and
estimate the channel responses from the received signals [6].
The pilot sequences are precious resources in cellular networks
since accurate CSI estimation requires low interference in the
pilot transmission phase (i.e., low so-called pilot contamina-
tion [7]). Contemporary networks have over-provision of pilot
sequences—many more orthogonal pilots than active UEs per
cell—thus the pilot contamination is essentially alleviated by
selecting the pilots at random in every cell and switch the
pilots regularly. In contrast, massive MIMO networks attempt
to schedule as many users as possible to achieve a high sum
spectral efficiency [4]. The number of pilot sequences then
fundamentally limits the number of active UEs per cell.
The early works on massive MIMO assumed that all pilot
sequences were used in all cells, in which case one can
only mitigate pilot contamination by exploiting spatial chan-
nel correlation as in [8], [9] or apply data-covariance-aided
estimation methods [10], [11].1 Recent works have shown
that it is often beneficial to coordinate the pilot allocation
with neighboring cells, for example, by having a non-universal
pilot reuse to avoid pilot contamination from the first tier of
interfering cells [4], [13], [14]. This approach can make the
impact of pilot contamination negligible for practical numbers
of antennas, but at the cost of serving fewer UEs per cell—
because only 1/3, 1/4, or 1/7 of the pilot sequences are used
in each cell. If this is not enough, it can also be applied in
conjunction with the data-covariance-aided methods proposed
1Time-shifting between data and pilot transmission has also been proposed
to mitigate pilot contamination, but it has later been shown that also interfering
data transmissions cause pilot contamination [12, Remark 5].
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2in [10], [11] to further suppress interference. This type of
pilot allocation is conceptually simple in symmetric networks
(e.g., one-dimensional cases as in [14] or two-dimensional
cases with hexagonal cells as in [4], [15]); one can cluster
the cells by coloring them in a symmetric pattern and divide
the pilot sequences so that only cells with the same color
use the same subset of pilots. The clustering in practical
asymmetric deployments, where every cell has a unique size
and shape, is non-trivial and must be optimized for each
particular deployment.
Notice that pilot allocation problems are, in some respect,
related to automated frequency assignment problems in cel-
lular networks [16], which date back to the 1960’s. These
problems are known to be solvable using graph coloring
algorithms, where a good assignment is characterized by
low interference between cells having the same color (i.e.,
frequencies). It is not straightforward to apply frequency
assignment algorithms for pilot allocation in massive MIMO,
since these networks transmit data with universal frequency
reuse. In contrast, an efficient pilot allocation mechanism for
massive MIMO determines the number of pilots and scheduled
UEs in each cell while taking the interference caused by all
other cells into account [15].
The purpose of this paper is to develop an algorithm
for adaptive pilot clustering, which can be applied for de-
centralized optimization in cellular networks with arbitrary
asymmetric cell geometries. To this end, we use tools from
coalitional game theory [17]. In our setting the set of players
in the coalitional game correspond to the BSs, and a coalition
between a set of players forms whenever they can take joint
actions which lead to mutual benefits. In our setting, a set
of BSs cooperate by sharing their pilot resources. Coalition
formation games provide us with structured mechanisms to
find the sets of cells which cooperate. Relying on rationality
assumptions of the players, the mechanisms are naturally im-
plementable in a distributed way. With such merits, coalitional
game theory has found many applications in communication
networks [18]–[22]. There are two types of coalitional game
models: the characteristic form and the partition form [23]. In
the characteristic form, the performance of a coalition assumes
a predetermined behavior of the co-players not involved in
the coalition. Coalitional games in partition form model the
utility of each member of a coalition depending on the overall
partition of the set of players, called the coalition structure.
Since in our model, the performance of a coalition depends
on the coalition structure, coalitional games in partition form
are suitable in our context.
The solution of a coalitional game is a coalition structure
which is stable according to a suitable stability model. In
general, the stability is closely related to the method of
deviation of the players; that is, the feasible ways to change
from one coalition structure to another. Two stability models
for coalition structures can be distinguished: group-based and
individual-based stability. Group-based stability is satisfied if
no set of players can jointly profit by changing the coalition
structure and building a coalition together. Some applications
of group-based stability solution concepts can be found in [18],
[20], [22]. In individual-based stability [24], the change in the
coalition structure occurs only when a single player leaves
a coalition to join another. Thus, individual-based stability
can be considered to be more restrictive than group-based
stability in the deviation model and hence is generally of less
complexity. Such stability concepts have been applied in [19]
in the context of cooperative channel sensing and access in
cognitive radio and in [21] for cooperative precoding in the
MIMO interference channel.
In this paper, we assume that each BS has a set of unique
pilot sequences. A set of BSs can share their pilot sequences if
they are in the same coalition, and consequently each BS in the
coalition can schedule a larger number of UEs. However, the
sharing of a BS’s pilot resources creates pilot contamination
effects within the coalition and might give a BS more pilots
than it has UEs. Moreover, increasing the number of active
UEs in the network increases the interference between the
cells. In order to capture these effects, we first characterize
the average sum SE of a cell depending on the underlying
coalition structure. Based on the utility model, we propose a
distributed coalition formation mechanism based on a model
from [25]: each BS can leave its coalition and join another
coalition if this strictly improves its average sum SE and does
not reduce the average sum SE of the members of the coalition
it joins. In order to control the complexity of the algorithm and
guarantee its convergence to an individually stable coalition
structure [25], we define a base station intercommunication
budget which limits the number of messages that can be sent
from one base station to the other base stations during coalition
formation. Simulation results reveal considerable performance
gains using coalition formation over one-cell coalitions and
universal pilot reuse.
Outline: In Section II, we describe the system model and
derive the average sum spectral efficiency of a cell for a
given coalition structure. The utility measures are utilized in
Section III to formulate the coalitional game in partition form
between the cells. Then, the coalition formation algorithm is
specified and analyzed regarding stability and complexity. In
addition, we provide a distributed implementation of the algo-
rithm in the setting. In Section IV, we discuss the simulation
results before we draw the conclusions in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL & SUM SPECTRAL EFFICIENCY
We consider the uplink of a cellular massive MIMO net-
work with L cells, each assigned with an index in the set
L = {1, . . . , L}. BS j is equipped with an array of M
antennas and has a maximum of Kmaxj connected single-
antenna UEs. The data transmission is divided into frames of
Tc seconds and Wc Hz, as illustrated in Fig. 1, which means
that each frame contains S = TcWc transmission symbols.
The frame dimensions are matched to the coherence blocks of
the channels so that the channel between each UE and each
BS can be described by a constant channel response within
a frame. In each uplink frame, B symbols are allocated for
pilot signaling and the remaining S−B symbols are used for
uplink payload data transmission.
The B pilot symbols permit B orthogonal pilot sequences;
that is, only B UEs in the network can transmit pilots without
3Wc
Time
Frequency
Tc
S–B payload data symbolsB pilots
Frame structure
Fig. 1: Frame structure in the uplink of a massive MIMO
system, where S = TcWc is the number of transmission
symbols per frame.
interfering with each other. In this paper, we study how the L
cells should share these pilot sequences in order to maximize
their sum spectral efficiency (SE), by balancing the number
of active number of UEs and the degradation in channel
estimation quality caused by having many UEs. Since pilot
contamination is mainly a problem in highly loaded networks,
where many UEs in each cell are requesting data, this is the
main focus of this paper. It is up to each BS to determine how
many of its UEs that are active in each frame.
A. Cell Cooperation Model
We assume that each cell is given a fraction Bcell = BL of
unique pilot sequences,2 where BL for convenience is assumed
to be an integer. BS j can keep its Bcell pilots by itself and
serve Bcell UEs without any pilot contamination. Alternatively,
it can form a coalition with other cells to share the access to
each others’ pilots, and consequently serve more UEs.
We define the coalition concept as follows.
Definition 1. A coalition structure C is a partition of L, the
grand coalition, into a set of disjoint coalitions {S1, . . . ,SN}
where
⋃N
n=1 Sn = L.
For notational convenience, we let Φj(C) denote the coali-
tion that BS j belongs to for a given coalition structure C. The
members of the coalition Φj(C) have access to |Φj(C)|Bcell
pilot sequences, where | · | ≥ 1 denotes the cardinality of a
non-empty set (i.e., the number of set members). Then, the
number of UEs that BS j ∈ Φj(C) can serve is
Kj(|Φj(C)|) = min
{|Φj(C)|Bcell,Kmaxj } . (1)
However, the drawback is that cells in the same coalition
contaminate each others pilot transmissions. Fig. 2 gives an
example of a cellular network with L = 16 cells in a quadratic
area. The cells are divided into four coalitions: green, yellow,
red, and blue. Since each coalition has four members, each
BS has access to 4Bcell pilot sequences and BS j serves
exactly Kj(4) = min{4Bcell,Kmaxj } UEs in each frame. Pilot
contamination occurs only between cells with the same color.
2This strategy is practically feasible if we consider the L cells comprising
a large cluster within a huge network in which the B pilots are reused.
Fig. 2: Illustration of a cellular massive MIMO system with
L cells and wrap-around. Each cell contains a BS with M
antennas and a number of single-antenna UEs. The colors
indicate coalitions of cells that use the same pilots.
The coalition formation in this paper will determine a coali-
tion structure C based on maximizing the SE in each cell. In
the following, after describing basic assumptions in our uplink
system model, we derive an expression for the average sum
spectral efficiency of a cell for a given coalition structureC.
For notational convenience, we drop the dependency on C and
write Φj and Kj instead of Φj(C) and Kj(|Φj(C)|).
B. Multi-Cell Channel Propagation
The vast majority of prior works on massive MIMO assumes
that each BS serves the same number of UEs (cf. [2], [4], [12],
[26]). In contrast, the BSs in this paper may form coalitions
of different sizes and thus serve unequal numbers of UEs. We
therefore start from the beginning and provide the basic uplink
system model for the problem at hand.
The UEs in a cell are picked at random from the coverage
area and we will later consider the average performance over
different UE distributions. In a certain frame, suppose that
zlk ∈ R2 is the position of the kth UE in cell l. The channel
response hjlk ∈ CM between this UE and BS j is modeled
as Rayleigh fading:
hjlk ∼ CN
(
0, dj(zlk)IM
)
, (2)
where IM is the M ×M identity matrix. The deterministic
function dj(z) gives the variance of the channel attenuation
from an arbitrary user position z to BS j. We assume that
the value of dj(zlk) is known at BS j for all l and k (it is
measured over frequency and tracked over time), while the
exact UE positions are unknown.
The UEs use power control to counteract the average
channel attenuation and achieve the same signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) to the serving BS irrespective of where the UE is.
This is key to achieve uniform performance and avoid near-far
issues in uplink multi-user MIMO. More precisely, we assume
that a UE at position zjk uses a transmit power of ρ/dj(zjk)
per symbol, where ρ is a design parameter and dj(zjk) is the
channel attenuation to the serving BS. The resulting average
SNR at any antenna of the serving BS is ρ/σ2, where σ2 is the
noise variance per symbol, and the average SINR also becomes
the same for all UEs in a cell since the uplink interference that
4affect a UE is independent of its own position. The parameter
ρ is selected so that all UEs in the cells comply with their
amplifier power constraints.
Recall from Fig. 1 that the first B symbols of each frame
are used for pilot transmission, which allows for B orthogonal
B-length pilot sequences. Each BS j serves Kj UEs and has
access to |Φj |Bcell pilot sequences, where (1) manifests that
the number of UEs is always fewer or equal to the number of
available sequences. To avoid cumbersome pilot coordination
within the coalition, BS j picks a subset of Kj pilot sequences
uniformly at random in each frame and distribute these among
its UEs. For some arbitrary UE k in cell j we let the random
variable χjklm be 1 if UE m in cell l uses the same pilot
sequence in a given frame and otherwise it is 0. The probability
of χjklm = 1 is 1|Φj |Bcell and the probability of χjklm = 0 is
1 − 1|Φj |Bcell . Using this notation, the effective received pilot
signal ypilotjk ∈ CM at BS j for its UE k is
ypilotjk =
√
ρ
dl(zjk)
Bhjjk
+
∑
l∈Φj(C)\{j}
Kl∑
m=1
χjklm
√
ρ
dl(zlm)
Bhjlm + ηjk
for k = 1, . . . ,Kj , (3)
when BS j has correlated the received signals with the pilot
sequence used by its UE k [26]. The first term in (3) is the
desired signal and the last term ηjk ∼ CN (0, σ2IM ) is the
effective additive noise. The middle term is interference from
UEs in cells of the coalition Φj , while we stress that there is
no interference from cells in other coalitions.
During uplink payload data transmission, all BSs are active
and the received signal yj ∈ CM at BS j is
ydataj =
L∑
l=1
Kl∑
m=1
√
ρ
dl(zlm)
hjlmxlm + nj , (4)
where xlm ∈ C is the data symbol transmitted by UE k in
cell l. This signal is normalized as E{|xlm|2} = 1, while the
corresponding UL transmit power is ρdl(zlm) , as defined earlier.
The additive receiver noise is modeled as nj ∼ CN (0, σ2IM ).
C. Channel Estimation and Average Spectral Efficiency
We will now compute closed-form achievable sum SE for
each cell, which are later used for coalition formation in
Section III. As usual in massive MIMO, the BSs use coherent
linear receive combining to detect the signals transmitted by
each of the served UEs. This requires instantaneous CSI and
we thus begin by stating the minimum mean-squared error
(MMSE) of the channels from the received pilot signals in (3).
Lemma 1. The MMSE estimate of hjjk at BS j (for a given
coalition structure C and given pilot allocations) is
hˆjjk =
√
ρdj(zjk)B
ρB +
∑
`∈Φj\{j}
K∑`
i=1
χjk`i
ρdj(z`i)
d`(z`i)
B + σ2
ypilotjk (5)
where hˆjjk ∼ CN (0, δjjkIM ) with the variance
δjjk =
ρdj(zjk)B
ρB +
∑
`∈Φj\{j}
K∑`
i=1
χjk`i
ρdj(z`i)
d`(z`i)
B + σ2
. (6)
The estimation error h˜jjk = hjjk − hˆjjk is independently
distributed as
h˜jjk ∼ CN
(
0, (dj(zjk)− δjjk)IM
)
. (7)
Proof: This lemma follows from applying standard results
from [27, Chapter 15.8] on MMSE estimation of Gaussian
vectors in Gaussian colored noise.
Notice that Lemma 1 gives the MMSE estimates of the
UE channels within the serving cell, and characterizes the
corresponding estimation errors. Each BS can also estimate
channels to UEs in other cells of its coalition, for which we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If χjklm = 1 for some l ∈ Φj , then the MMSE
estimate of hjlm is
hˆjlm =
dj(zlm)√
dj(zjk)dl(zlm)
hˆjjk, (8)
where hˆjlm ∼ CN (0, δjlmIM ) has the variance
δjlm =
(dj(zlm))
2
dj(zjk)dl(zlm)
δjjk (9)
and the independent estimation error is
h˜jlm = hjlm − hˆjlm ∼ CN
(
0, (dj(zlm)− δjlm)IM
)
. (10)
This lemma shows the essence of pilot contamination,
namely that hˆjlm and hˆjjk are equal up to a scaling factor
when the corresponding UEs utilize the same pilot sequence.
This important result is later used in the appendix when
deriving SE expressions.
The linear detection at BS j consists of assigning a com-
bining vector gjk ∈ CM to each of the Kj UEs in the cell. By
multiplying the received payload data signals in (4) with these
vectors, the effective scalar signal gHjky
data
j should amplify the
intended signal xjk from the kth UE in the cell and/or suppress
the interfering signals.
Let Hˆj = [hˆjj1 . . . hˆjjKj ] ∈ CM×Kj be a matrix with
the estimated channels from Lemma 1 for the UEs in cell j.
Two typical combining schemes are maximum ratio combining
(MRC), which obtains the highest signal gain by setting
[gMRCj1 . . . g
MRC
jKj ] = HˆjDj , (11)
where Dj = diag(M−1δ−1jj1, . . . ,M
−1δ−1jjKj ) is a diagonal
matrix3, and zero-forcing combining (ZFC) where the pseudo-
inverse of Hˆj is used to suppress intra-cell interference:
[gZFCj1 . . . g
ZFC
jKj ] = Hˆj(Hˆ
H
j Hˆj)
−1. (12)
In order to measure the data throughput in the cells, we use
the ergodic capacity, which is the deterministic information
3The normalization of hˆjjk by M−1δ−1jjk in MRC makes the expected
channel gain E{gHjkhjjk} = 1 for both MRC and ZFC, and simplifies the
derivations.
5SINRjk =
ρ
dj(zjk)
|E{h,χ}{gHjkhjjk}|2∑
l∈L
Kl∑
m=1
ρ
dl(zlm)
E{h,χ}{|gHjkhjlm|2} − ρdj(zjk) |E{h,χ}{gHjkhjjk}|2 + σ2E{h,χ}{‖gjk‖2}
(14)
IMRCj (C) =
∑
l∈Φj\{j}
Kl
|Φj |Bcell
µ(2)jl + µ(2)jl −
(
µ
(1)
jl
)2
M
+(∑
S∈C
∑
l∈S
Kl
M
µ
(1)
jl +
σ2
Mρ
)1 + ∑
`∈Φj\{j}
K`
|Φj |Bcellµ
(1)
j` +
σ2
Bρ

(18)
IZFCj (C) =
∑
l∈Φj\{j}
Kl
|Φj |Bcell
µ(2)jl + µ(2)jl − (Kl + 1)
(
µ
(1)
jl
)2
M −Kj
− Kj
M −Kj
+

∑
S∈C
∑
l∈S
Klµ
(1)
jl +
σ2
ρ
M −Kj

1 + ∑
`∈Φj\{j}
K`
|Φj |Bcellµ
(1)
j` +
σ2
Bρ
 (19)
rate that can be reliably communicated over a fading channel.
The following lemma provides achievable sum SE expressions,
applicable for any receive combining scheme including MRC
and ZFC.
Lemma 3. Consider a given coalition structure C, where cell
l serves Kl UEs for all l ∈ L. A lower bound on the average
ergodic sum capacity achieved in cell j is
SEj =
Kj∑
k=1
(
1− B
S
)
E{z} {log2(1 + SINRjk)} [bit/symbol]
(13)
which is a summation of the average ergodic SEs of the
Kj UEs in that cell. For given UE positions, the signal-to-
interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) of the kth UE in cell j is
given in (14) at the top of the page, where the expectation
E{h,χ}{·} is with respect to the channel realizations and pilot
allocations. The outer expectation E{z}{·} gives the average
over different UE positions in the network.
Proof: Proved in the same way as [4, Lemma 2].
Note that Lemma 3 provides average ergodic sum SEs with
respect to different UEs positions, different pilot allocations
within the cells, small-scale fading variations, and CSI estima-
tion errors. It is a lower bound on the ergodic capacity, which
is unknown for multi-cell scenarios with imperfect CSI. The
pre-log factor has two parts: a summation over the number of
active UEs in the cell Kj given in (1) and the loss from the
pilot signaling overhead (1− BS ). It is only the effective SINR,
SINRjk, that depends on which receive combining scheme
that is used in the network.
Next, we use Lemma 3 to compute closed-form SE expres-
sions for the MRC and ZFC schemes, when using the MMSE
channel estimates obtained in Lemma 1. These expressions
characterize the practically achievable data throughput per cell,
which will later be used as utility functions. As a preparation,
we define the following propagation parameters:
µ
(1)
jl = Ezlm {dj(zlm)/dl(zlm)} , (15)
µ
(2)
jl = Ezlm
{(
dj(zlm)/dl(zlm)
)2}
, (16)
where the expectations are with respect to the arbitrary distri-
bution of UE positions in cell l and thus take the large-scale
fading into account. The first one, µ(1)jl , is the average ratio
between the channel variance to BS j and the channel variance
to BS l, for a UE in cell l. The second one, µ(2)jl , is the second-
order moment of the same ratio. Hence, µ(2)jl − (µ(1)jl )2 is the
variance of this ratio. Notice that µ(1)jj = µ
(2)
jj = 1 when the
two indices are the same, while the parameters are smaller
than one when the indices are different. In general, we have
µ
(1)
jl 6= µ(1)lj while equality only holds for symmetric networks
where the corresponding cells have the same shape. We use
these propagation parameters to get the following result.
Theorem 1. For a given coalition structure C, a lower bound
on the average ergodic sum capacity in cell j is
Uj(C) =
(
1− B
S
)
Kj log2
(
1 +
1
Ischemej (C)
)
[bit/symbol]
(17)
where the interference term Ischemej with MRC and with ZFC
(for M > Kj) are given respectively in (18) and (19) at the
top of the page.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
The closed-form lower bounds in Theorem 1 are slightly
more conservative than the non-closed-form bound in Lemma
3. However, Fig. 3 shows that the difference is negligible
when dealing with MRC and ZFC.4 Note that maximizing
the sum SE might lead to operating points with many active
UEs and low SE per UE, but this is still beneficial for all
UEs as compared to time-sharing where each UE is only
4This figure was generated using the same simulation setup as in Section
IV and Fig. 5, with L = 20 cells, random coalitions, and varying number of
BS antennas.
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Fig. 3: Monte Carlo simulations for the average ergodic sum
capacity in Lemma 3 for comparison with the lower bound in
Theorem 1.
active part of time but exhibit a higher SE when being
active. Theorem 1 generalizes previous results in [4], which
only covered fixed pilot allocations and an equal number
of UEs per cell. Although the interference terms IMRCj (C)
and IZFCj (C) have lengthy expressions, these are easy to
implement and have intuitive interpretations. The first part
of both expressions describes the pilot contamination and is
only impacted by the cells that have formed a coalition with
BS j. The second part describes the conventional inter-user
interference (from all cells). MRC suppresses the impact of
other signals and noise by amplifying the signal of interest
using the full array gain of M , while ZFC only achieves an
array gain of M−Kj since BS j sacrifices degrees of freedom
for interference suppression within the cell. The interference
suppression results in the extra negative term on the first row in
(19), and ZFC is preferable over MRC whenever the reduced
interference is more substantial than the loss in array gain.
Which of the schemes that provide the highest performance
varies depending on the SNR, the coalition design, and how
strong the interference is between the cells.
The average sum SE Uj(C) in (17) for cell j should
preferably be as large as possible. This is the utility function
that we assign to BS j in the remainder of this work. There
are thus L different utilities and their values depend on the
selection of combining scheme (e.g., MRC or ZFC) and on
the coalition structure C. The average sum SE Uj(C) is based
on the ergodic capacities of UEs at different locations, which
connect and disconnect to the network over time. This is a
good utility if the data package transmitted by each UE spans
many fading realization (over time and frequency) or when M
is large so that fading averages out due the channel hardening.
We envision a coalition formation mechanism that makes
decisions based on the average throughput over time intervals
of at least a second.5 Since Uj(C) depends on the number
of UEs available in the cells, the coalition structure C should
be updated when the number of UEs changes significantly.
Small-scale variations in the number of users occur at the
millisecond level (due to bursty traffic), but the important
large-scale variations occur over the hours of the day [28].
5Shorter coherence times and more intermittent user activity enable shorter
time intervals since there is more randomness.
The network designer can select how often it is worth to re-
optimize the coalition structure.
From the structure of the pilot contamination terms, it is
preferable for a BS to form coalitions with cells that are far
away, but this intuition is hard to transform to any simple
algorithm for coalition formation, except for completely sym-
metric cellular networks as in [4]. For general asymmetric
networks the system designer can, in principle, traverse all
possible coalition structures, but unfortunately the number
of possibilities equals the Lth Bell number, which has a
faster growth than exponential with L. Consequently, finding a
globally optimal pilot assignment is hard. In the next section,
we therefore formulate the design problem as a coalitional
game and provide an efficient decentralized algorithm to find
stable coalition structures.
Remark 1 (Uplink-downlink duality). The average ergodic
SE in Theorem 1 is for the uplink, but can also be used
to describe the downlink. There is a property called uplink-
downlink duality that, basically, says that the same sum SE
can be achieved in both directions—using the same total
transmit power, but with different power allocation over the
UEs. The classic duality concept was established in [29]
and [30] for perfect CSI, and it was generalized to massive
MIMO in [4]. As a consequence, network optimization (e.g.,
coalition formation) based on the uplink formulas in Theorem
1 optimizes also the downlink.
III. COALITIONAL GAME
We analyze in this section cooperation between the BSs
using coalitional games. The strategies of the BSs are directly
related to the coalition they are members of; that is, they share
their pilots with the cells in their coalition. Since the average
SE of each cell, given in Theorem 1, depends on the coalition
structure (Definition 1), we need to study the coalitional game
in partition form [23], which we formulate by
〈L, U˜〉. (20)
Here, the set of players corresponds to the set of BSs L. Let
P be the set of all partitions of L. The partition function
U˜ : P → RL assigns a payoff to each player for each partition
in P and will be formulated shortly in (21).
When considering cooperation between the BSs (players),
we assume that they are able to communicate with each other
and exchange specific application-type messages. This is pos-
sible in cellular networks due to the existence of backhaul links
connecting the BSs [31]. However, there is a cost involved
in communication between the BSs which is quantified in
terms of the number of data packets exchanged among them.
In order to limit this overhead, we introduce a base station
intercommunication budget qj ∈ N for each BS j in L, which
limits the total number of data packets sent from BS j to the
other BSs during coalition formation. With this constraint, the
nontransferable utility of a player j is formulated as
U˜j(C, ηj) =
{
Uj(C) if ηj ≤ qj ,
0 otherwise,
(21)
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Fig. 4: Illustration of the deviation model.
where Uj(C) is the average sum SE of cell j given in The-
orem 1, and ηj ∈ N represents the number of data packets
which player j has already sent to the other BSs. The utility
model in (21) gives a player j zero utility if it has exhausted its
BS intercommunication budget qj . Note that, besides suitably
controlling the messaging overhead between the base stations,
the intercommunication budget will be used to ensure con-
vergence of the coalition formation algorithm (Algorithm 2)
where the parameters ηj are updated.6
From Theorem 1, the utility of cell j depends on which
members are in its coalition Φj(C) through the pilot con-
tamination term as well as the interference term determined
by the coalitions formed outside Φj(C). Therefore, so-called
externalities exist [34]. More specifically, our game relates to
the category of coalitional games with negative externalities
in which the merging of coalitions reduces the utility of the
members of all coalitions not involved in the merging. This
occurs due to the increased number of scheduled UEs and
thereby increasing the interference.
In considering a coalitional game, we adopt the game
theoretic assumptions which imply that each player’s behavior
follows the maximization of its utility function in (21) based
on the discovery of profitable opportunities [17]. Such be-
havior is important for the distributed implementation of our
solution concept which we specify and discuss next. We stress
that our solution is not limited to the performance measures in
Theorem 1 but can be utilized in conjunction with any other
utility function (e.g., utility functions that take other types of
channel fading into account).
A. Coalition Formation
Coalition formation describes the dynamics which lead to
stable coalition structures. We use a coalition formation model
from [25] in which a single player is allowed to leave its
coalition and join another only if it is profitable for the player
and all members of the coalition it wants to join. Such a
coalition formation model has been used, e.g. in [19] in the
context of cognitive radio settings.
Three elements are needed to describe our coalition for-
mation game [22], [35], [36]: 1) a deviation model; 2) a
comparison relation which indicates whether a deviation is
acceptable; and 3) a stability concept for coalition structures.
6Another way to ensure convergence of the considered coalition formation
algorithm is by associating with each player a history set which is utilized to
prevent the player from joining a coalition it has been a member of before,
as in e.g. [19], [21], [32], [33].
Definition 2 (Deviation). A cell j ∈ L leaves its current
coalition Φj(C) to join coalition S ∈ C∪{∅}. In doing so, the
coalition structure C changes to CS . We capture this change
in the coalition structure by the notation CS j←− C.
An illustration of the deviation model is given in Fig. 4.
Observe that a deviation entitles a player to search for alterna-
tives within the current coalition structure. Given a coalition
structure C, the number of searches by a player j is upper
bounded by
Dj(C) =
{
|C| if |Φj(C)| > 1
|C| − 1 otherwise. (22)
The two cases in (22) differ by the possibility whether player
j can join the empty set or not, where the latter case is
not relevant when player j is in a singleton coalition. The
worst case deviation complexity corresponds to the coalition
structure in which all players are in singleton coalitions. Then,
Dj({{1}, . . . , {L}}) = L − 1 which is linear in the number
of players.
According to the individual stability concept in [25], a
deviation is admissible if a player can strictly improve its
performance by leaving its current coalition to join another
coalition ensuring that the members of the coalition it joins
do not reduce their utility.
Definition 3 (Admissible deviation). A deviation CS j←− C is
admissible if
U˜j(CS , ηj) > U˜j(C, ηj) and U˜k(CS , ηk) ≥ U˜k(C, ηk),
for all k ∈ S. (23)
Such a deviation requirement is suitable for our setting due
to the fact that each cell exclusively owns a set of pilots and
any BS that wants to join a coalition by sharing its pilots with
the coalition members must first ask their permission.
Following the players’ rationality assumption, admissible
deviations according to Definition 2 will be pursued by the
players. Accordingly, we utilize the following stability concept
for coalition structures [25].
Definition 4 (Individual stability). A coalition structure C is
individually stable if there exists no j ∈ L and coalition S
such that CS j←− C is admissible.
A generic coalition formation algorithm which terminates
at a individually stable coalition structure is stated in Algo-
rithm 1. The algorithm is initialized with an arbitrary coalition
8Algorithm 1 Coalition formation algorithm.
Initialize: t = 0, coalition structure C0;
1: repeat
2: Find a player j ∈ L and a coalition S ∈ Ct;
3: if deviation CSt j←− Ct is admissible then
4: Update coalition structure Ct+1 = CSt ;
5: Increment coalition index: t = t+ 1;
6: until No deviation is admissible
Algorithm 2 Implementation of coalition formation.
Initialize: t = 0, C0 = {{1}, . . . , {K}}, ηj = 0, j ∈ L;
1: repeat
2: for all BSs j ∈ L do
3: find acceptable coalitions
Dj = {S ∈ Ct | U˜j(CSt , ηj) > U˜j(Ct, ηj), CSt j←− Ct}
4: for all S ∈ Dj selected in random order do
5: if ηj ≤ qj then
6: Ask members of S for permission to join;
7: Increment the BS intercommunication cost;
8: for all BSs k ∈ S do
9: if U˜k(CSt , ηk) ≥ U˜k(Ct, ηk) then
10: BS k accepts;
11: Increment the BS intercommunication cost;
12: if all BSs k ∈ S accept BS j then
13: BS j leaves Φj(Ct) and joins S;
14: Update coalition structure Ct+1 = CSt ;
15: Increment the coalition index: t = t+ 1;
16: Inform all BSs about new coalition structure;
17: Increment the BS intercommunication cost;
18: until No cell deviates
structure C0. In each iteration, a player j and a coalition S
are selected to check whether their deviation is admissible
according to Definition 3. If so, the coalition structure changes
according to the deviation. Since Algorithm 1 iterates over
all BS deviation opportunities, an individually stable coalition
structure is reached whenever the algorithm converges. The
distributed implementation of Algorithm 1, which we provide
next, is guaranteed to converge since we impose the intercom-
munication budget constraint for each player as in (21).
B. Distributed Algorithm
In Algorithm 2, we provide an implementation of Algo-
rithm 1. We initialize the coalition structure in C0, which
can be the singleton coalitions (corresponding to no pilot
reuse) or any other coalition structure. A BS j is selected
at random to check if a deviation is profitable. Based on the
local knowledge of the current coalition structure Ct and the
propagation parameters, BS j can calculate its utility in (21) if
it joins other coalitions in Dj ⊆ Ct. Note that Dj includes only
the coalitions in which BS j would strictly profit by joining.
BS j selects coalitions S ∈ Dj at random7 in Line 4. If ηj
7Random selection of a coalition S in Dj is reasonable given the uncer-
tainty that S would accept player j to join its coalition.
satisfies the budget constraint (Line 5), BS j sends a message,
included in a single data packet, to the members of coalition
S indicating that it wants to join their coalition (Line 6) and
increments its BS intercommunication cost in Line 7. Each
BS k ∈ S can calculate its utility locally for the case that
BS j enters the coalition. If the utility of BS k ∈ S does not
decrease (Line 9), then BS k accepts BS j (Line 10) by sending
its decision in a message to BS j. Here, BS k increments
its BS intercommunication cost in Line 11. Otherwise, BS
k does not reply to BS j’s request. If all BSs in coalition S
accept BS j (Line 12), meaning that the deviation is admissible
(Definition 3), then BS j leaves its coalition and joins S.
The coalition structure is updated in Line 14 and all BSs are
informed of the new coalition structure through a message
from BS j. Algorithm 2 terminates when no deviations take
place anymore.
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we illustrate the coalition formation by
simulations. We consider frames with S = 400 symbols (e.g.,
Tc= 4 ms and Wc= 100 kHz) and a pathloss exponent of 3.
The SNR per receive antenna at the BS is SNR = ρσ2 = 5 dB,
which is achieved for every UE by virtue of the power control
policy described in Section II-B.
We assume that each BS owns Bcell = bαSL c unique pilot
sequences where α determines the fraction of the frame used
for pilot signaling. In the simulations, we set α = 0.5 except
for the plot in Section IV-E. The available number of UEs in
each cell is chosen to be the same: Kmaxj = K
max for all
j ∈ L. When considering different number of cells, we ensure
the same BS density of 25 BSs/km2 by appropriately choosing
the region area the cells are deployed in.
For the coalition formation algorithm, we do not include
the intercommunication budget constraint for the base stations,
except in Section IV-D. Although there is no guarantee for
convergence of the coalition formation algorithm without this
budget restriction, we witnessed convergence in all simulation
instances. We initialize the coalition formation algorithm using
two different coalition structures, to evaluate the impact of
the initialization. One initial coalition structure is singleton
coalitions which corresponds to no pilot reuse. The other initial
coalition structure is generated randomly with an average
coalition size of d√Le, which is roughly the average coalition
size that the coalition formation algorithm achieves in the
simulations.
Throughout, we compare pilot clustering according to coali-
tion formation to three schemes:
• The first scheme uses no pilot reuse which is called
noncooperation.
• The second scheme corresponds to random coalition
structures with average coalition size of d√Le. Having
this scheme, which has similar average coalition sizes
as coalition formation, highlights the importance of the
selection of the members of each coalition.
• The third scheme corresponds to using all available pilots
by all the cells (full pilot reuse) but with user scheduling
dictated by the coalition formation algorithm initialized
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Fig. 5: Average SE per cell for different number of cells L with M = 500 and Kmax ≥ 200.
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Fig. 6: Coalition sizes and number of searches per cell associated with the curves in Fig. 5 for different number of cells L
with M = 500 and Kmax ≥ 200. The solid (dashed) curves correspond to MRC (ZFC).
with singleton coalitions. Including this scheme, with
similar scheduling as coalition formation, emphasizes the
importance of the pilot reuse patterns.
We obtain the average performance using 2×103 uniformly
random BS deployments with uniform user distributions in
each cell and a wrap-around topology, as exemplified in Fig. 2.
A. Number of Cells
In Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b, the average sum SE per cell
obtained in Theorem 1 with the MRC and ZFC schemes
are plotted, respectively, for different number of BSs. Note
here that we ensure the same BS density as discussed at
the beginning of this section. The number of UEs per cell
is chosen sufficiently large such that Kmax ≥ LBcell. The
optimal solution, which includes an exhaustive search over all
possible coalition structures (corresponding to the Lth Bell
number), can be calculated for up to L = 7 cells.
Random coalition formation whose average coalition size is
d√Le, has similar performance as the full pilot reuse scheme.
Both schemes are outperformed by the coalition formation
algorithms, and it can be observed that the gains from coalition
formation slightly increase with the size of the network.
Initializing coalition formation with singletons gives slightly
better performance than starting in random coalition structures.
The average coalition sizes achieved by coalition formation
starting in singletons are shown in Fig. 6a. The results for
coalition formation starting in random coalitions are similar
and thus omitted. It can be noticed that the average coalition
sizes are relatively small compared to the size of the network
and scales roughly as d√Le. This result has influenced the
choice of the average coalition sizes for the random scheme
and random initialization. In comparison to MRC, ZFC has
slightly smaller average coalition sizes. The reason for this is
ZFC favors scheduling smaller number of users in the cells
compared to MRC since ZFC expends a larger amount of the
available spatial degrees of freedom for interference nulling.
The average number of messages sent per BS during coali-
tion formation, corresponding to the plots in Fig. 5, is shown
in Fig. 6b and is observed to be very small compared to
the size of the network. Clearly, initializing the algorithm in
random coalitions leads to faster convergence and less message
exchange between the base stations than starting in singletons.
B. Number of BS antennas
In Fig. 7, the average sum SE per cell with ZFC is plotted
for different number of BS antennas M and different number
of available UEs Kmax in each cell. The qualitative perfor-
mance achieved using MRC is comparable to that of ZFC and
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Fig. 7: Average sum spectral efficiency per cell using ZFC
for different number of antennas at the BSs M . The number
of cells is L = 20.
is hence omitted. Coalition formation generally outperforms
the other schemes and the gains in coalition formation increase
for larger number of antennas.
For Kmax = 10, noncooperation is optimal since each cell
can schedule all available UEs with the pilots it possesses,
given Bcell = b S2Lc = 10. In this case, both coalition
formation with different initializations terminate in singletons.
For larger Kmax, initializing coalition formation in singletons
has better performance than starting in random coalitions as
can be seen for Kmax > 10. This effect is studied in more
detail in Section IV-C when we study the dependency of the
performance on Kmax.
The average coalition sizes associated with Fig. 7 do not
show dependence on the used number of antennas M . We
reveal these depending on Kmax also in the next section for
fixed M = 500.
C. Available Users in Each Cell
Fig. 8a shows how the gains in coalition formation increase
with the number of users in each cell Kmax. Observe that the
number of scheduled users with full pilot reuse is the same
as coalition formation starting in singletons. Also, the random
coalitions scheme and coalition formation which is initialized
in random coalitions have almost similar number of scheduled
users in the cells which can be seen from the average coalition
sizes in Fig. 8b.
For Kmax = 10, noncooperation is optimal since each cell
can schedule all its users with the available pilots. Starting
in singletons, no deviations occur during coalition forma-
tion while starting in random coalitions, the BSs are able
to leave their initial coalitions to form singleton coalitions.
For Kmax = 20, and having Bcell = 10, it is sufficient
to build coalitions of sizes of two to schedule all UEs in
the cells. Coalition formation starting random has average
coalition sizes of about four which is not efficient as is seen
in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8a. Therefore, coalition formation starting
with singleton coalitions is favored over random coalition
structure initialization.
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Fig. 8: Performance using ZFC for different number of
available users in each cell. The number of cells is L = 20
and the number of antennas at each BS is M = 500.
For coalition formation starting in singletons, the average
coalition size in Fig. 8b is slightly larger than two although
coalitions with two members are sufficient to schedule all
users. Here, the BSs profit from excess pilots in order to
reduce the pilot contamination in the coalition. Recall, that
we assume random allocation of the pilots among the BSs in
the same coalition when the number of UEs in the cell is less
than the available pilots.
For large values of Kmax, larger coalitions enable schedul-
ing a larger number of users. Both coalition formation al-
gorithms have similar performance and converge to similar
average coalition sizes as is shown in Fig. 8b. Compared to
the other schemes, the gains with coalition formation increase
with Kmax.
D. Base Station Intercommunication Budget
The complexity of coalition formation is reflected by the
average number of messages sent from each BS, illustrated
in Fig. 9. The number of messages, ηj , that a BS j sends
during coalition formation is incremented in Algorithm 2.
As seen in Fig. 9, the curves saturate at a relatively low
value and meet the corresponding limits (dashed curves)
which correspond to coalition formation without the budget
restriction.
E. Number of Pilots
In Fig. 10, we show the effects of changing α which
determines the fraction of the frame used for pilot signaling.
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The number of cells is L = 20 and the number of antennas is
M = 500.
The optimal choice of α is strictly less than 0.5 and will
generally depend on the number of antennas M . The outcome
from coalition formation gives high performance adapting to
different choices of α.
V. CONCLUSION
A distributed coalition formation algorithm is proposed in
this paper for pilot allocation in the uplink of cellular massive
MIMO networks with arbitrary geometry. Each BS is assumed
to possess a few unique pilots which can be shared with other
BSs in a coalition. The sharing of pilot resources permits
scheduling more UE in the cooperating cells, however at the
cost of increased pilot contamination effects and interference.
We address the problem of finding the sets of cooperating
BSs using coalitional games in partition form, by taking the
number of pilots, the number of available users in each cell,
the CSI quality, the receive combining scheme (MRC or ZFC),
and the interference into account. The proposed coalition
formation algorithm is based on an individual stability solution
concept whose distributed implementation is shown to require
low communication overhead between the BSs. Hence, it can
both be used for offline cell planning and for online coalition
formation that adapts the system to the small-scale user load
variations that occur at the millisecond level due to bursty
traffic or to the natural large-scale traffic variations over the
day. Performance gains are achieved over baseline pilot reuse
schemes for different network sizes and number of antennas
at the BSs.
While the numerical results are based on the closed-form
utility functions that were derived in this paper, we stress that
the proposed coalition formation algorithm can be applied for
many other utilities functions as well.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In the case of MRC, the expectations in (14) can be
computed directly as
E{h,χ}{gHjkhjjk} = E{h,χ}
{
1
Mδjjk
hˆHjjkhˆjjk
}
= E{χ}
{
Mδjjk
Mδjjk
}
= 1
and in (24), at the top of next page, where the notation Aj
was introduced for brevity. In this computation we used the
fact that E{χjklm} = 1|Φj |Bcell .
Moreover, for l 6∈ Φj , or for l = j with k 6= m, we have
E{h,χ}{|gHjkhjlm|2} = dj(zlm)E{h,χ}{‖gjk‖2} =
Aj
M
dj(zlm)
dj(zjk)
since the MRC vector is independent of the channels in other
coalitions and the channels of other UEs in the same cell. For
l ∈ Φj we can perform the calculations in (25) at the top of
next page, where the first equality follows from separating the
two cases χjklm = 0 and χjklm = 1, where gjk and hjlm
are independent in the first case and parallel in the second
case; see Lemma 2. The second equality in (25) follows from
computing the expectations with respect to the channel fading,
where E{h}{‖hˆjjk‖4} is computed using [37, Lemma 2]. The
third inequality follows from some simple algebra and the last
equality from the fact that E{χjklm} = 1|Φj |Bcell .
By plugging these expectations into (14) and dividing all
terms with ρdj(zjk) , we obtain
SINRjk = (26)
1∑
l∈Φj\{j}
Kl∑
m=1
(dj(zlm))2
(dl(zlm))2
1
|Φj |Bcell +
∑
l∈L
Kl∑
m=1
1
M
dj(zlm)
dl(zlm)
Aj +
σ2
ρ
Aj
M
.
The expression in (18) is obtained by computing an achiev-
able lower bound
E{z}{log2(1 +
1
f({z}) )} ≥ log2(1 +
1
E{z}{f({z})} )
where the expectation with respect to user positions are moved
to the denominator of the SINR in (26). These exceptions are
computed as follows:
E{z}
{
Kl∑
m=1
(dj(zlm))
2
(dl(zlm))2
1
|Φj |Bcell
}
=
Kl
|Φj |Bcellµ
(2)
jl (27)
E{z} {Aj} = E{z}
1 + ∑
`∈Φj\{j}
K∑`
i=1
1
|Φj |Bcell
dj(z`i)
d`(z`i)
+
σ2
Bρ

= 1 +
∑
`∈Φj\{j}
K`
|Φj |Bcellµ
(1)
j` +
σ2
Bρ
(28)
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E{h,χ}{‖gjk‖2} = E{h,χ}
{
‖hˆjjk‖2
M2δ2jjk
}
= E{χ}
{
Mδjjk
M2δ2jjk
}
=
1
M
E{χ}
{
1
δjjk
}
=
1
M
E{χ}

ρB +
∑
`∈Φj\{j}
K∑`
i=1
χjk`i
ρdj(z`i)
d`(z`i)
B + σ2
ρdj(zjk)B
 =
1
M
1
dj(zjk)
1 + ∑
`∈Φj(C)\{j}
K∑`
i=1
1
|Φj |Bcell
dj(z`i)
d`(z`i)
+
σ2
Bρ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Aj
, (24)
E{h,χ}{|gHjkhjlm|2} = E{χ}
{
(1− χjklm)dj(zlm)
M2δ2jjk
E{h}{‖hˆjjk‖2}
}
+ E{χ}
{
χjklm
M2δ2jjk
(
(dj(zlm)− δjlm)E{h}{‖hˆjjk‖2}+ (dj(zlm))
2
dj(zjk)dl(zlm)
E{h}{‖hˆjjk‖4}
)}
= E{χ}
{
(1− χjklm)dj(zlm)
Mδjjk
+ χjklm
(
(dj(zlm)− δjlm)
Mδjjk
+
(dj(zlm))
2
dj(zjk)dl(zlm)
δ2jjk(M +M
2)
M2δ2jjk
)}
= E{χ}
{
dj(zlm)
Mδjjk
+ χjklm
(dj(zlm))
2
dj(zjk)dl(zlm)
}
=
dj(zlm)
Mdj(zjk)
Aj +
1
|Φj |Bcell
(dj(zlm))
2
dj(zjk)dl(zlm)
(25)
E{z}
{∑
l∈L
Kl∑
m=1
1
M
dj(zlm)
dl(zlm)
Aj
}
=
∑
l∈L
Kl
M
µ
(1)
jl
1 + ∑
`∈Φj\{j}
K`
|Φj |Bcellµ
(1)
j` +
σ2
Bρ

+
∑
l∈Φj\{j}
Kl
|Φj |Bcell
(
µ
(2)
jl − (µ(1)jl )2
)
M
(29)
Similarly, the expectations in (14) can be computed for ZFC
as
E{h,χ}{gHjkhjjk} = E{h,χ}{gHjkhˆjjk} = 1 (30)
and
E{h,χ}{‖gjk‖2} = E{h,χ}{[(HˆHj Hˆj)−1]kk}
=
1
M −Kj E{χ}
{
1
δjjk
}
=
1
M −Kj
Aj
dj(zjk)
(31)
which follow from the zero-forcing definition and by utilizing
well-known properties of Wishart matrices (see e.g., [12, Proof
of Proposition 3]).
Furthermore, for l 6∈ Φj we have
E{h,χ}{|gHjkhjlm|2} = dj(zlm)E{h,χ}{‖gjk‖2}
=
1
M −Kj
dj(zlm)
dj(zjk)
Aj ,
(32)
while for l = j we obtain (33), at the top of next page, where
Jensen’s inequality can be used to prove that
E{χ}
{
δjjm
δjjk
}
≥ ρdj(zjm)BAj
ρdj(zjk)BAj
=
dj(zjm)
dj(zjk)
(35)
which leads to an upper bound on the interference term. In
the same way, one can show that for l ∈ Φj \ {j} we have
E{h,χ}{|gHjkhjlm|2} ≤
(dj(zlm))
2
dj(zjk)dl(zlm)
1
|Φj |Bcell
+
1
M −Kj
dj(zlm)
dj(zjk)
(
Aj − Kj|Φj |Bcell
dj(zlm)
dl(zlm)
)
(36)
where the inequality is due to (35), 1|Φj |Bcell is the chance that
a particular UE in another cell uses the same pilot sequence as
UE k in cell j, while Kj|Φj |Bcell is the chance that a particular UE
in another cell uses any of the Kj pilot sequences used in the
cell j. By plugging these expectations into (14) and dividing
all terms with ρdj(zjk) , we obtain the lower bound in (34) at
the top of next page. Next, we use Jensen’s inequality in the
same way as for MRC to move the expectation with respect
to user positions to the denominator of the SINRs. The final
expression in (19) follows from computing the expectations
using (27)–(29).
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